In this paper we document first that, in contrast with their widely perceived excess returns, popular carry trade strategies yield low systemic-risk-adjusted returns. In particular, we show that carry trade returns are highly correlated with the return of a VIX rolldown strategy -i.e., the strategy of shorting VIX futures and rolling down its term structure-and that the latter strategy performs at least as well as beta-adjusted carry trades, for individual currencies and diversified portfolios. In contrast, hedging the carry with exchange rate options produces large returns that are not a compensation for systemic risk. We show that this result stems from the fact that the corresponding portfolio of exchange rate options provides a cheap form of systemic insurance.
Introduction
The high returns of the forex carry trade -i.e., investing in high interest rate currencies and funding it with low interest currencies-has led to an extensive literature documenting the "puzzle" and its robustness to a wide variety of controls.
1 This carry trade premium is not explained by traditional risk factors, such as those suggested by Fama and French (1993) . 2 Moreover, several recent works have examined whether carry returns can be explained by crash risk and concluded that it cannot. Most prominently, Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski et al. (2011) find that hedging the carry with ATM FX options leaves its returns unchanged, and therefore conclude that the crash risk exposure is not the source of the premium.
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The main contribution of this paper is to turn the puzzle on its head. We reconcile the past findings by showing that while the standard carry trade is essentially compensation for systemic risk, the corresponding bundle of crash protection FX options are puzzlingly cheap.
In particular, we show that carry trade returns are highly correlated with the returns of a VIX rolldown strategy -i.e., the strategy of shorting VIX futures and rolling down its term structure-for individual currencies as well as for diversified portfolios. 4 We find that while typical carry trade strategies produce large returns, this is explained by its comovement with VIX rolldowns. On the other hand, portfolios of exchange rate options designed to hedge the carry provide a cheap form of systemic risk insurance. As a result, when the carry trade is hedged with exchange rate options, its average return remains strongly significant even after controlling for its exposure to VIX rolldowns. 1 The profitability of the carry trade strategy stems from the fact that high interest rate currencies tend to appreciate rather than depreciate, in constrast with the most basic implication of the uncovered interest parity condition.
2 See, e.g., Table 4 from Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski et al. (2011) . 3 Farhi et al. (2009) uses currency options data to estimate that crash risk may account for roughly 25% of carry returns in developed countries, leaving plenty of the carry return unexplained. 4 The VIX is an S&P500 implied volatility index, which is often described as the "global (financial) fear" indicator.
As a preview of our results, we run regressions of the form z t = α + x t β + e t wherez t are the excess returns to a carry trade portfolio and x t are the excess returns to VIX rolldowns.
5 Figure 1 plots the cumulative returns to carry strategies that place equal weights on each of the 25 countries in our sample against the required returns based on their exposure to VIX rolldowns. 6 Panel A shows the results for the standard carry, and
Panel B is for the carry when hedged with at-the-money exchange rate options. Each panel includes two series:
(1 +z j ) − 1 ("Realized") and t j=1 1 + x jβj−1 − 1 ("Required").
While the unhedged carry does only marginally better than its required returns, the hedged carry beats its systemic counterpart by more than a factor of 10. For the unhedged carry, the annualized Sharpe ratio is 0.47, below the 0.57 of its required returns. But for hedged carry, the realized Sharpe ratio of 0.79 is nearly 40% higher than the 0.57 earned by its required returns. This suggests that exchange rate options earn a significant premium above that which would be required based on their systemic exposure. Indeed, we find that after controlling for its systemic exposure, the portfolio of carry protection options alone earns a Sharpe ratio of 1.19, and we thus conclude that such a portfolio of exchange rate options is a cheap form of systemic insurance.
5 Our data are monthly from March 2004 (the starting date for VIX futures) to August 2012.
where z i,t are the (either hedged or unhedged) excess returns to the carry for currency i using USD as the base currency. in USD. Since this strategy is both costless and riskless, any profits would be pure arbitrage.
Therefore the following arbitrage condition is expected to be satisfied most of the time:
This is known as the covered interest parity condition (CIP). In particular, it states that
where f t = log(F t ), s t = log(S t ), r t = log(1 + r t ), and r * t = log(1 + r * t ). The quantity f t − s t is commonly referred to as the average forward discount, and we write
The carry trade is a simple risky variant on this strategy where the investor elects not to purchase the forward FX contract in the hope that the USD will not appreciate by enough to eliminate his entire profits. Denote the net payoff from this strategy by
Using CIP, this can be rewritten as
That is, the carry trade strategy is equivalent to buying
FCU forward. The investor will make profits on average as long as E t (S t+1 ) > F t , and will only lose money if the USD appreciates to the point that S t+1 < F t . In what follows, we will focus on the simpler and more commonly employed version of the carry trade where the investor buys 1 FCU forward.
We define the excess return to this strategy as
Risk-based Explanations
As discussed in the introduction, empirical research has found the carry trade to produce puzzlingly high returns to investors. In principle, these returns could simply represent compensation for some form of risk, but it has proven difficult to identify which risks are relevant. In this section we describe a simple and standard framework for assessing risk-based explanations, which we will rely upon for our analysis.
Standard models of asset prices can be reduced to the specification of an asset pricing kernel, M t+1 , such that
holds for any excess return R t+1 denominated in USD. Plugging in z t+1 = R t+1 , we see that
The historical literature, surveyed by Engle (1996), focuses on the special case where
In that case, the forward rate is an unbiased predictor of the future spot rate, and the average excess carry return is zero. Both of these hypotheses have been consistently rejected empirically where researchers have estimated the regression
and rejected the hypothesis that α = 0 and β = 1. This is commonly referred to as the forward premium puzzle. In fact, estimates of β are often negative, implying that high interest rate currencies actually tend to appreciate, exactly the opposite from what would be expected.
Allowing for non-zero correlation between exchange rates and the pricing kernel opens the door for risk-based explanations. Rewriting things slightly, one can see that
whereβ is the slope coefficient from the regression of
. Next if
Therefore,
where β = bβ. In other words, the model predicts that if one runs the regression of z t = α + βx t + t , one should find that α = 0. 8 Here α is the portion of the excess return z t that remains after controlling for its exposure to the factors x t . The quantities z t −βx t are commonly referred to as the pricing errors from the model whereβ is the coefficient estimated by OLS. The goal then becomes identifying a set of excess returns x t that have this property. The classical example of this approach is Fama and French (1993) which shows that a set of three factors that do a very good job of pricing US equities. In this project, we consider using excess returns on VIX futures to price currency forwards.
Data
We obtained daily closing spot and forward exchange rates from Datastream for 67 coun- find the trading day such that the maturity date of the contract is the same as the maturity date for the FX forward rates. 9 Since there is never more than one VIX futures expiration date in a single month, this procedure creates approximately non-overlapping holding periods at the one month horizon. In total, we have 96 observations for each country. We also employ daily data on the Fama-French three factors for the same period, which were obtained from Kenneth French's website. Daily returns are compounded to match the holding periods under consideration. Our primary analysis focuses on a set of relatively developed countries, the Expanded Majors as defined by Bloomberg, and we exclude the countries from this set which do not have floating exchange rates. 10 This leaves us with a total of 25 countries in our primary sample.
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We also collected daily data on the implied volatilities of at-the-money (spot) exchange rate options with a one month horizon from Datastream for 22 out of the 25 countries in our primary sample. 12 We convert implied volatilities into prices using the Black-Scholes model.
Our options data covers the same period as our other data, and thus contains 96 monthly observations.
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We consider two different periods of time for our analysis. For comparability with the literature, our primary period of interest includes only the dates in our sample prior to the financial crisis of 2008 (pre-crisis). 14 We also focus on this period because in all likelihood the full sample dramatically overstates the probability of a catastrophic downturn in financial markets. However, we will show that the results from the pre-crisis period carry over qualitatively into the full sample period.
Carry Trade and Systemic Risk: Pre-Crisis

Traditional Carry Trade Portfolios
In this section, we begin by presenting results for the typical diversified carry trade strategies that have been the focus of much of the recent literature. These are portfolios of 10 We follow the IMF's classification of currencies, which is available at its website. We include only currencies which are classified by the IMF as either "Independently floating" or "Managed Floating with no pre-determined path for the exchange rate."
11 Our primary sample of currencies includes AUD, BRL, CAD, CHF, CLP, COP, CZK, EUR, GBP, HUF, IDR, ILS, INR, KRW, MXN, NOK, NZD, PEN, PLN, SEK, SGD, TRY, TWD, USD, ZAR.
12 The three excluded currencies are CZK, HUF, and PEN. Options pricing data for NZD were not available after February 2012.
13 Implied volatility data for TRY is missing for the first two observations in the sample. 14 Specifically, we include monthly holding periods ending on May 19, 2004 indexes currencies, ω denotes portfolio weights, and x t is the excess returns to a long position in VIX futures. Table 1 summarizes the results from these regressions for the pre-crisis period. In every case, the excess carry trade returns were highly significant, consistent with the findings of Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski et al. (2011) . However, the exposure of these strategies to systemic risk is evident from the also highly significant values of β in all regressions.
Importantly, after correcting for this risk exposure, we find little excess returns, as the estimated α s are statistically indistinguishable from 0 in all but one case.
17 15 We assess whether r * t > r t by looking at a currency's average forward discount. 16 Following Jurek (2009), currency neutral carry portfolios are computed in the following way. First, two sub-portfolios are formed one containing only those currencies with corresponding interest rates higher than that of the US and the other with only lower interest rate currencies. The final portfolio is equally weighted in these two sub-portfolios. The portfolio weighting scheme (EQL or SPD) refers to the weights used to construct the sub-portfolios. 17 In the Appendix, we show that the results are robust to controlling for the Fama- These findings also carryover to individual currency pairs. 
Options Hedged Carry Trade
Up to now, we have shown that hedging the carry trade with a long position in VIX rolldowns leaves investors with no significant excess returns. Next, we consider the natural alternative of hedging with exchange rate options. The strategy we examine involves purchasing an ATM call option on any exchange rate where the carry trader holds a short forward position and an ATM put on exchange rates where the carry trader is long. For 4 currencies in our sample (AUD, EUR, GBP, NZD), our options data is provided for the USD/FCU rate. In those cases, we compute the options hedged carry trade returns as
In all other cases, the options data is for the FCU/USD rate, so we compute returns as
Our primary analysis involves the same regressions as before, but replacing z t with z h t as the dependent variable. Table 2 We dissect these results further by separating currencies into interest rate quintiles that are rebalanced every period. Figure 5 illustrates that the gains from hedging with options comes primarily from the low interest rate quintiles. For the two lowest quintiles, the carry trade returns were actually negative on average, but positive payoffs from options were enough to outweigh those losses. Meanwhile, at the two highest quintiles, Sharpe ratios were unchanged by hedging with options. In the α − space, the gains still come primarily at the lowest quintiles where α s go from negative to positive. However, the highest quintiles also experienced some gains via a reduction in systemic risk exposure. Since the lowest quintile is comprised entirely of short positions in foreign currencies, we find that call options on funding currencies are especially cheap as both overall (Panel A) and systemic (Panel B) insurance. 
A New Puzzle
Given our earlier results on the systemic exposure of unhedged carry returns, these findings on the options-hedged carry suggest that a strategy involving only foreign exchange options designed to hedge carry returns may provide a cheap form of systemic insurance.
We test this claim in the context of our model by regressing the excess returns to FX options on the excess returns to VIX rolldowns where the dependent variable is computed as
for those options quoted in terms of USD/FCU and
for those options quoted in FCU/USD. Estimates are contained in Table 3 for various portfolios of these options. In every case, the portfolio of options is significantly positively correlated with a long position in VIX rolldowns. This is not surprising, as the options strategies are designed to hedge the carry. However, the important result is that these portfolios have very large α s that are strongly significant in all cases, indicating that they do indeed provide (excessively) cheap systemic insurance. Notes: Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. Avg. carry and α are annualized. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. * -p<0.10, ** -p<0.05, *** -p<0.01.
That is, the new puzzle is that there is premium to selling systemic risk insurance, hedged with currency options. The conventional carry trade is a form of selling systemic insurance, which when hedged with FX-options generates an excess return. But the source of the excess return is in the low cost of the hedge, not the high return of the carry itself.
Carry Trade and Systemic Risk: Full Sample
Having examined the properties of typical carry trade strategies when hedged with either VIX futures or FX options during (relatively) normal times, it remains to be seen how these hedges perform in a sample that contains a major financial turndown. In this section, we explore this issue by using our full sample period that extends to August 2012 and includes the major asset market collapse surrounding the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008. Although there are some nuances, the core message of the previous section remains unchanged. Table 4 presents our factor regressions for the unhedged carry over this period. As noted earlier, our full sample overstates the empirical frequency of crises, and the result is that we do not see the strikingly positive carry trade returns as in the pre-crisis period or as has been documented for longer periods of time in previous work. On the other hand, as in the pre-crisis period, the exposure of the carry to systemic risk remains strongly significant in all cases, and taking this exposure into account leaves the carry with broadly reduced returns and T-statistics. The JPY based carry even underperforms relative to its systemic exposure. Turning next to the options hedged carry, regression results are shown in Table 5 .
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As before, the hedged carry is significant and remains so after correcting for its systemic exposure. This happens even though the unhedged carry is not broadly significant. On average, the T-statistics for the hedged carry are nearly double those for the unhedged carry.
Currency level regressions confirm these results where all but 6 currencies' T-statistics were higher for their hedged strategy, as illustrated in Figure 7 . carry outperformed. We also plot the cumulative returns to the two strategies in Figure 9 .
Interestingly, while the gains from hedging came largely from increased expected returns for lower quintiles, the gains for high quintiles were entirely from reduced volatility. Finally, we implement our direct test of whether the appropriately constructed bundle of FX options provide a cheap form of systemic insurance. The results presented in Table 6 confirm our findings from the pre-crisis. 
Final Remarks
To summarize, we find that after appropriately hedging the carry trade with VIX rolldowns in both samples that exclude and include crises, there is no evidence that its return is particularly large, and in the latter, there is evidence that it may actually be too small. This contrasts with Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski et al (2011) who find that the returns to the carry trade are not a compensation for risk. On the other hand, like those previous authors, we find that when the carry is hedged with FX options, it does indeed produce significantly positive returns for which we have no risk-based explanation. Taken jointly, our two sets of results suggest that portfolios of FX options designed to hedge the carry trade provide a relatively cheap means of hedging systemic risk, and our tests confirm this hypothesis.
Put differently, the new puzzle is that there is a premium to selling systemic risk insurance, hedged with currency options. The conventional carry trade is a form of selling systemic insurance, which when hedged with FX options generates an excess return. But the source of the excess return is in the low cost of the hedge, not the high return of the carry itself.
A Appendix
A.1 Carry Trade and Fama-French Risk Factors: Pre-Crisis
In this section, we analyze the exposure of the equally weighted carry to the traditional FamaFrench risk factors (MKT, SMB, HML), as studied in Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski et al. (2011) . In the pre-crisis period, the estimates confirm that the carry trade is not significantly exposed to these traditional factors, and controlling for them leaves a significant excess return. Furthermore, we find that even after controlling for the Fama-French factors, the carry remains significantly exposed to VIX rolldowns, and the resulting α is still insignificant. Notes: Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity, and α's are annualized. T-statistics for α's are reported in parentheses. * -p<0.10, ** -p<0.05, *** -p<0.01.
